How sustainable is participatory watershed development in India? by Bouma, J.A. et al.
AGRICULTURAL
ECONOMICS
Agricultural Economics 36 (2007) 13–22
How sustainable is participatory watershed development in India?
Jetske Boumaa, Daan van Soestb,∗, Erwin Bulteb
aInternational Water Management Institute (IWMI), Hyderabad, India, and Department of Economics, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
bDepartment of Economics, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Received 20 September 2005; received in revised form 8 February 2006; accepted 2 March 2006
Abstract
Watershed conservation is widely recognized as a major strategy for rural development throughout the developing world. In India, the apparent
success of participatory approaches to watershed development resulted in a decentralization of project planning, implementation, and management
to local communities at the village scale. We explore the effectiveness of this so-called community-based approach in achieving sustainable soil and
water conservation in four semi-arid regions in India, and analyze what factors explain project success. We confirm the result of earlier studies that
participatory approaches are more effective in establishing soil and water conservation in the short run. However, our main result is that investments
in community organization fail to ensure household commitment to maintenance in the longer term. Without better returns to investment in soil and
water conservation and without local institutions to coordinate investment in the long run, the sustainability of participatory watershed management
is seriously threatened.
JEL classification: O12, O19, Q01, Q25
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1. Introduction
In India’s semi-arid regions, watershed development (WSD)
is one of the main strategies for rural development. Over the
past decades the government of India annually invested approx-
imately $500 million in WSD (Government of India, 2000). The
main objective of the program is to increase the productivity
of rainfed agriculture by rehabilitating the resource base, thus
offering rural households a sustainable way to increase their
livelihood conditions. In early periods, investments were rather
technical and implementation was mostly top-down. However,
evidence that this approach was not very successful, combined
with the apparent success of bottom-up approaches pursued by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), stimulated a gradual
shift in focus (e.g., Kerr et al., 2002). By now, most watershed
programs have evolved towards participatory WSD, decentral-
izing the planning, implementation, and management of soil and
water conservation (SWC) to local communities at the village
scale.1
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1 Soil and water conservation is the aggregated term for investments in bund-
ing, drainage line treatment, small dams and other measures to reduce soil
Participatory WSD has become a good example of the
so-called community-based and -driven approaches that have
become one of the fastest growing mechanisms for channeling
development assistance (Mansuri and Rao, 2004).2 The pop-
ularity of the approach stems from the claim that involving
communities in project design and implementation improves
investment targeting, increases government responsiveness,
empowers the poor and strengthens community governance.
However, evidence of the extent to which community-based
approaches live up to these expectations is scarce: Mansuri and
Rao (2004) detect a general dearth of well-designed evaluations
erosion, increase soil moisture, and recharge water storage structures and/or
groundwater aquifers. WSD explicitly plans and implements soil and water
conservation at the larger scale of the watershed (i.e., the area from which all
water drains to a common point) in order to technically optimize investment.
It is basically a systems-based approach that explicitly accounts for up-down
stream linkages and externalities of resource conservation at the plot and inter-
plot scale.
2 For example, the World Bank’s portfolio for community based and driven
approaches doubled over the last 6 years to roughly $7 billion. Regarding
definitions, “community based” actively includes beneficiaries in project design
and management, “community driven” gives communities direct control over
key project decisions, including management of investment funds (Mansuri and
Rao, 2004).
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with few examples proving a causal link between the participa-
tory intervention and project outcomes.3 With respect to par-
ticipatory WSD in India, a major evaluation was undertaken by
Kerr et al. (2002). This study found participatory approaches to
be more effective than the earlier top-down approach, attribut-
ing success mainly to its flexibility and to the time and resources
committed to community organization.
The main objective of this article is to assess the extent to
which participatory approaches are also more effective in the
long run. Whereas most studies focus on the short-term ef-
fectiveness of participatory WSD, there are indications that its
long-run impact is much smaller. ODI et al. (2002) conclude
from a qualitative study of several projects that maintenance of
SWC is poor because institutions for community governance
fail to manage resources in a sustainable way. Kerr et al. (2002)
argue that poor maintenance can be attributed to poor invest-
ment targeting and over-subsidization. If households receive
SWC structures they do not really want, these structures are
unlikely to be maintained in the long run.
To what extent investments in community organization result
in better investment targeting4 and stronger conservation man-
agement at the village scale, is an open question. We address
this question by analyzing the impact of participatory WSD
on the intention of households to contribute to soil and water
conservation in the long run while controlling for other factors
such as market access, income inequality and resource scarcity.
This allows us to identify conditions under which WSD efforts
are more likely to succeed.
The methodology used is a cross-sectional analysis of data
from 697 randomly selected households in four meso-scale wa-
tersheds. To distinguish between short- and long-term impacts,
we study the effect of interventions on stated actual house-
hold investments in SWC, and on the intention of households
to contribute to the operation and maintenance of SWC struc-
tures in the future. Whereas our analysis of actual household
SWC investments confirms that participatory approaches are
more effective than top-down approaches in the short run, our
analysis of household intentions indicates that investments in
community organization do not increase the sustainability of
WSD in the long run. The article is organized as follows. In
the second section of the article we present the conceptual
framework. The third section deals with the methodology and
describes the characteristics of the data set. The results of the
analysis are presented in section four, and in section five we
draw conclusions.
2. Conceptual framework
With relatively poor resource endowments and low and er-
ratic rainfall, the revenues of agricultural production in India’s
3 Similarly, Agarwal (2001) notes that there are few systematic evaluations
of community resource management: since most studies use a case study ap-
proach, it is generally not possible to compare the relative importance of factors
influencing community resource management success.
4 Kerr et al. (2002) suggest that the negative impact of subsidization on SWC
maintenance seems less pronounced in participatory projects.
semi-arid regions are uncertain (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Soil
fertility and water scarcity are major constraints for agricultural
production, and the average productivity of dryland agriculture
is low. Technological development and investments in rural
infrastructure (electricity, roads) did improve living standards
through access to markets, inputs and ground water irrigation
(Fan et al., 1999), but water scarcity and rainfall insecurity re-
main crucial production constraints (Ryan and Spencer, 2001).
Also, because of the ongoing intensification of agriculture,
groundwater depletion and soil erosion have become serious
threats.
Extensive research has shown that SWC can increase the pro-
ductivity of dryland agriculture and improve the sustainability
of resource use (e.g., Wani et al., 2002 and 2003). However, a
recurring concern is that farm households are reluctant to invest
in SWC (e.g., Barbier, 1990; Heerink et al., 2001; Pender and
Kerr, 1998). There are two explanations for why this may be the
case.
First, the private benefit–cost ratio of SWC is often low, espe-
cially when compared to investments in (groundwater) irriga-
tion and agricultural intensification (Walker and Ryan, 1990).
Low farm gate prices, uncertain revenues, and increasing op-
portunity costs of labor due to improved off farm employment
opportunities tend to make investment in rainfed agriculture
unattractive.5
Second, investments in SWC have important public good
externalities that give individual households an incentive to
free ride (Baland and Platteau, 1996 and 1997). Depending
on the type of investment, the size of the externality varies.
For example, in situ investments in soil conservation tend to
have fewer externalities than investments in water harvesting,
because with water harvesting more of the benefits of conser-
vation are shared.6 In the presence of significant externalities,
investment decisions depend on the expected behavior of oth-
ers. If people trust others to reciprocate SWC investment or if
a local authority exists to control free rider behavior, the likeli-
hood of collective investments increases. Since in most dryland
watersheds no organizations exist to coordinate soil and water
conservation,7 community organization is needed to facilitate
local cooperation and to enhance local commitment and trust.
5 Also, with over 30% of the households in India’s semi-arid regions being
classified as poor (Ryan and Spencer 2001), farm households tend to go for
short-term benefits instead of investing in sustained productivity (Bardhan and
Udry, 1999).
6 The costs and benefits of soil and water conservation are not only shared
at the village, but also at the inter-village scale; investments in the upper
catchment area of the watershed tend to affect downstream areas as well. This
is what inspired the WSD approach: by planning and implementing SWC at
the scale of the watershed, investments can be coordinated and externalities
internalized at the watershed scale. Critics however have pointed to the fact that
communities do not function at the level of the watershed (Kerr et al. 2002,
Rhoades 1998, Swallow et al. 2001). Hence, most watershed development
projects are implemented at the village scale, and up-down stream externalities
are insufficiently addressed (Batchelor et al., 2003; Shah and Raju, 2001).
7 Traditionally, local institutions for community resource conservation and
management did exist. Local warlords, kings, or religious organizations made
the required investments and coordinated the operation and maintenance on the
longer term (Mosse, 2003). With the invasion of Muslim and, later, colonial
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To address the low benefit–cost ratio of SWC investments
and to stimulate poor households to take up conservation mea-
sures on their plots, interventions in WSD heavily subsidize
SWC investment. Depending on the program, households con-
tribute only 0%–25% to investment costs in terms of voluntary
labor. With project wages above the market wage and with high
unemployment, in most cases investments are effectively subsi-
dized by over 100% (Kerr et al., 2002). An important reason for
the over-subsidization of investments in WSD is the fact that in
most regions the WSD program did not start as a project aimed
at increasing the productivity of dryland agriculture, but as a
program to offer employment in times of drought (Shah, 2005).
Although the focus shifted over time, subsidy rates remained
high.
To increase the effectiveness and sustainability of WSD
interventions, project implementers increasingly invest in
community organization.8 There are several reasons why such
investments are expected to increase the sustainability of WSD.
First, investments in community organization increase the ef-
fectiveness of participation. This is important to better target
project investment and to reach a socially acceptable distri-
bution of project benefits. Second, investments in community
organization strengthen local institutions and hence commu-
nity governance. Thus, it contributes to control of free riding
behavior and coordination of investments at the village scale.
At the most basic level, this implies the establishment of a wa-
tershed committee,9 but investments in local capacity building,
empowerment, and communication are also needed to enhance
community governance in the long run (Joy and Paranjape,
2004).
Evidence of the extent to which investments in community
organization have indeed improved the sustainability of WSD
is sketchy. In the short term, investments in community orga-
nization seem to have improved effectiveness through better-
targeted investments and a better distribution of project effects
(Farrington et al., 1999; Joshi et al., 2004; Kerr et al., 2002). In
the longer term however, the impact of investments in commu-
forces, traditional structures were disrupted. Increased population pressure,
integration of semi-arid regions in the mainstream economy and new irrigation
and crop technologies further reduced the strength of community resource
management, and in most cases water conservation and storage structures were
no longer maintained (Jodha, 1996).
8 Also, the government guidelines for WSD evolved from rather top-
down, technology based subsidization programs toward more participatory
approaches: In the WSD guidelines of 1995, participatory watershed manage-
ment and investments in community organization became the norm.
9 Formally, the village council, or Panchayat Raj institution (PRI), is respon-
sible for the management of resources at the village scale. However, since PRIs
usually do not have the capacity or resources to manage resources effectively,
WSD programs have focused on the establishment of a functional watershed
committee instead. The extent to which watershed committees actually con-
tribute to community governance varies a lot: in some cases, the watershed
committee exists only on paper, whereas in other cases it continues to coordinate
investments in a transparent and democratic way. Most watershed committees
however dissolve after project implementation. For this reason, the most recent
government WSD guidelines (the “Hariyali guidelines”; Government of India,
2003) give PRI’s a more important role in WSD.
nity organization is less clear and it is difficult to assess whether
lack of SWC maintenance is caused by over-subsidization, lack
of investment in community organization or because of exter-
nal effects. This is what this study attempts to contribute: to
assess (i) whether investments in community organization have
improved the sustainability of soil and water conservation in
India’s semi-arid watersheds, and (ii) whether any effects can
be attributed to SWC subsidization, investments in community
organization or external factors (such as market access, or re-
source scarcity).
With regard to the importance of external factors, from the
literature on farm household decision making and local re-
source management, the impact of contextual factors, such as
market access, resource scarcity and inequality, on household
decision making is well known (e.g., Agarwal, 2001; Baland
and Platteau, 1996; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Ostrom, 1990;
Ray, 1999; Wade, 1987). The incentive to invest in soil and wa-
ter conservation, or, for that matter, to cooperate in collective
investments, largely depends on the net benefit the household
expects to make. In resource-scarce environments this benefit
might actually be relatively small. Kadekodi and Chopra (1999)
argue that the relationship between resource scarcity and coop-
eration is in fact nonlinear. Users do not cooperate if resources
are very scarce, but may decide to cooperate if the resource
base is rehabilitated and the expected benefits of cooperation
increase. Similarly, increased market integration is expected to
have an ambiguous impact on local resource management. The
increased value of resource use associated with market integra-
tion affects the conditions for local management positively, but
the increase in “exit options” and volatility of income may affect
resource management in a negative way (Kurian et al., 2002).
The impact of inequality on community resource management
is ambiguous as well (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Mansuri and
Rao, 2004). If the distribution of resource access is highly un-
equal, resource conservation might benefit as individual owners
have an incentive to provide public good investments. But high
inequality also affects community resource management nega-
tively, as it reduces the incentive to cooperate and decreases the
transparency of village decision making.
3. Methodology and data collection
To analyze the impact of investments in community orga-
nization on the sustainability of participatory watershed de-
velopment, we use household survey data from 697 randomly
selected, land-owning households in four meso-scale water-
sheds.10 Table 1 shows the characteristics of the watersheds.
10 Study sites and data collection form part of the LEAD project “Livestock–
Environment Interactions in Watersheds,” a study undertaken by IWMI—India
and partners and financed by the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and
the FAO. Although in the four study sites a total of 800 households were
surveyed, due to missing data we could only include 697 households in the
analysis. Landless households accounted for less than 5%.
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Table 1
Characteristics of the study sitesa
Very low rainfall < 500 mm Low rainfall > 500 mm
Remote area Kanakanala watershed,
(Koppal district)
Karnataka
Kalyanpur watershed,
(Udaipur district)
Rajasthan
Integrated area Vaiju Babulgaon watershed,
(Ahmadnagar district)
Maharastra
Kosgi watershed,
(Mahbubnagar district)
Andhra Pradesh
Source: IWMI (2005).
aFor a more extensive characterization of the study sites, see Appendix 1.
Table 2
Investments in soil and water conservation per watershedb
Watershed Implementing Watershed Area Costs per ha
agent area (ha) treated treated area
(Rs/ha)c
Kosgi DPAP (government) 3,460 58% 3,553
Kanakanala SAMUHA (NGO) 13,064 48% 2,582
Kalyanpur DPAP (government)
and Seva Mandir
(NGO)
7,488 27% 5,488
V. Babulgaon DPAP (government)
and WOTR (NGO)
4,876 24% 6,826
Source: IWMI (2005).
bFor a more extensive description of project interventions, see Appendix 2.
c1 USD = 35 Indian Rs.
In each watershed, 4–6 villages were selected based on their
location in the meso-watershed.11 From the selected villages,
20% of the households were randomly drawn to participate in
the survey. Of the total of 22 villages selected for the household
survey, some had been treated by a NGO, some had been treated
by a governmental organization (GO) and some had not been
treated at all. Table 2 shows the intensity of treatment12 in
the four watersheds and whether WSD was implemented by a
GO, NGO or a combination of both. Overall, NGOs invested
much more in community organization, participatory planning
and implementation than GOs. In fact, the NGOs represented
include some of the most successful examples of WSD in India.
In the following, when we mention participatory we refer to the
NGO approach.
The selection of villages for WSD treatment is based on the
location of the village in the meso-watershed. As treatment of
11 To account for possible up-down stream externalities we explicitly selected
villages from the upper, middle, and lower region of the meso-watershed. How-
ever, because of low availability and poor quality of hydrological data we could
not assess the importance of up-down stream externalities in a quantitative way.
The information from village meetings and household interviews however indi-
cated that positive up-down stream externalities exist. Contrary to the accepted
belief that upstream villages benefit less, households from upstream villages
generally indicated they had benefited from WSD considerably as well.
12 Intensity of treatment refers to the percentage of the (meso-) watershed
treated and the costs of investment per hectare. Since exact data on treatment
costs and area treated were hard to come by, figures are only indicative of the
intensity with which treatment of the meso-watershed has taken place.
Table 3
Representation of households in terms of WSD treatment and location
Not GO NGO
treated treated treated
Number of sample
villages
7 7 8
Number of sample
households (HHs)
234 320 249
Location in watershed
(% of HHs)
Up 0 Up 37% Up 54%
Middle 68% Middle 63% Middle 0
Down 32% Down 0 Down 46%
Source: IWMI (2004).
the upper catchment of the watershed tends to also benefit down-
stream villages, WSD programs target upstream villages first.
Since geographical location is something we can control for,
project selection of upstream villages does not necessarily bias
our results (Ravallion and Wodon, 1998). However, upstream
villages could also be poorer than downstream villages, which
might constitute another WSD selection criteria, or there could
be other project placement criteria that bias results in an unob-
servable way (Baker, 2000). To detect a potential selection bias
we conducted several tests. First, assuming average income to
be a reasonable indicator for the level of economic development
and poverty, we tested whether treatment was in any way corre-
lated with average income. The lowest P-value being 0.79, there
seem to be no significant differences in average income between
treatments and sites. Second, we estimated the probability of
NGO, GO, or no treatment using village level indicators such as
village homogeneity, average income, location, and inequality.
Except for location, none of the factors were significant. Hence,
we can safely assume that project placement does not affect our
results in a significant way, except for effects associated with
the geographical location of the village in the meso-watershed
for which we added a separate control. In Table 3, the represen-
tation of sample household in terms of received WSD treatment
and location in the watershed is shown.
For the analysis of the household survey data we specify two
empirical models. In the first model the dependent variable is
a binominal variable that reflects whether the household has
actually invested in SWC or not. This is a stated variable, based
on whether the household indicated that investments in soil
and water conservation were made at the plot level.13 In the
second model the dependent variable is a binominal variable that
expresses whether the household has the intention to contribute
to SWC in the future. Again, this is a stated variable.14 Since
13 Since most households only invested in soil and water conservation on one
of their plots we conduct the analysis at the household and not the plot level.
If the household invested on more then one plot, we included only one plot,
usually the largest plot, in the analysis.
14 Since different answers were possible, we defined two dependent variables.
In the first, all positive answers (use less water, more stall feeding, operation,
and maintenance [O&M] of structures on own plot, O&M collective structures
etc.) are grouped into one category (“Planned contribution All”); in the second
definition only the answers specifying O&M activities were taken as a positive
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in both cases the dependent variable is discrete, we use probit
analysis.15
In the first model, our main interest is whether outside in-
tervention influences the probability of household SWC invest-
ment, controlling for external factors. We tested the following
model:
SW i = constant + Cβ1 + Iβ2 + Xiβ3 + εi, (1)
where SWi is a discrete measure of household investment in
SWC, C is a vector of contextual variables, I is a vector of
variables measuring the type of intervention and Xi is a vector
of control variables including income per capita, land holding,
access to irrigation, location in the watershed and land quality.
Regarding C, most of the set of contextual variables is derived
from the location of the watershed in the region and the agro-
hydrological zone. While the socio-economic conditions of re-
mote watersheds may be characterized as those of a subsistence
economy, watersheds that are better integrated into the regional
and national economy may be regarded as cash economies. Fur-
thermore, watersheds differ with respect to aridity and income
inequality. Income inequality seems to depend mainly on the
distribution of resource access (i.e., irrigation and land), which
is relatively equal in Vaiju Babulgaon and relatively unequal in
Kosgi. In Kanakanala, irrigation is relatively underdeveloped,
and hence inequality is relatively low.
Our intervention variables, I, capture the nature of the agent
implementing WSD. In Kanakanala an NGO initiated water-
shed investments, in Kosgi a GO, and in Vaiju Babulgaon and
Kalyanpur a GO treated some villages whereas other villages
were treated by an NGO. In all four sites at least one of the
selected villages was not treated at all.16 As mentioned before,
NGOs spent more on community organization, but they often
spent more on physical SWC investments as well. In the first
model, we cannot separate these two effects since data on in-
vestment costs per household or village lack. In the second
model we attempt to separate these two effects by using direct
and indirect intervention effects.17 Table 4 presents summary
statistics for Xi, or the vector of control variables.
As Table 4 shows, average income is four times higher in
the Vaiju Babulgaon watershed as compared with the other
watersheds. To control for the higher level of socio-economic
answer (“Planned contribution only O&M”). The two definitions allowed for
extra robustness tests, which showed minimal differences between the two
definitions (see Table 7).
15 In the absence of specific knowledge about the distribution of data, there
exist no general criteria to determine whether probit is the most suitable method
to use (Greene, 2003). Since the outcomes of logit and probit were quite similar,
we chose probit as it allows for an easier interpretation of results.
16 Villages in the process of treatment have been included under the “not
treated” category.
17 Since NGOs do not offer higher subsidies (they often offer lower subsidies)
we do not expect higher investments to result in extra distortions. Instead,
we expect higher investment cost to translate into higher-quality investment
and better coverage of households in the area treated. This has actually been
confirmed in village meetings and household interviews in the four watersheds.
Table 4
Summary statistics (standard deviations in parenthesis)
Kosgi Kanakanala Kalyanpur V. Babulgaon
Number of observations 149 186 174 184
HH with investments in
SWC
30% 35% 36% 61%
Households that plan to
contribute to SWC–All
17% 12% 59% 93%
HH that plan to contribute
to SWC–O&M
13% 11% 52% 79%
Average income per
capita (Rs)
2,824 2,531 1,808 10,668
(3,752) (1,825) (1,681) (8,172)
Gini coefficient income 0.41 0.35 0.38 0.36
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)
Average landholding
(acres)
4.10 9.41 2.64 5.87
(5.52) (7.66) (4.31) (8.00)
HH with access to
irrigation (%)
58% 17% 75% 95%
HH with black soil in the
relevant plot (%)
34% 17% 21% 31%
HH that feel capable to
influence village
decision making (%)
23% 39% 18% 47%
Source: IWMI (2004).
development in this watershed, we included the variable “av-
erage income per region,” in the regression analysis.18 Access
to irrigation is defined as a dummy representing whether a
household has access to surface water (a village tank), deep
groundwater (a tube well), or shallow groundwater (open well)
irrigation through the ownership of pumps, wells, or land lo-
cated near the irrigation canal. Land holding size is relatively
large in Kanakanala, as population pressure is relatively low. In
Kalyanpur average landholding size is smallest since more than
50% of the watershed has a slope of over 5%. Land quality,
mainly determined by soil type, slope, and access to irriga-
tion, is heterogeneous in all four watersheds. Most households
own different plots of land with different soil types, slopes,
and access to irrigation. For the analysis, we have used only
land quality information regarding the plot on which invest-
ments in SWC were made. Because of the poor quality of slope
data, the importance of slope in determining household invest-
ment in SWC could not be assessed. Finally, the households’
perceived influence on village decision making is a dummy
variable which measures whether the household feels capable
of influencing village decision making: with this variable we
expect to measure the households’ position in village decision
making.19
18 In fact, the Vaiju Babulgaon watershed is not only characterized by a high
level of socio-economic development, but also by a homogeneous, landown-
ing, and high-caste (i.e., influential) farming population. Whereas 82% of the
population in Vaiju Babulgaon consists of high caste farmers, in Kalyanpur
94% of the population consists of “tribals” with less agricultural background.
Kosgi and Kanakanala have a more heterogeneous population, with 70% of the
households belonging to less privileged castes.
19 Although we expected the type of intervention to influence the households’
perceived ability to influence decision making, the households’ landholding and
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The second model aims at unraveling the impact of several
factors on the intention to invest in operation and maintenance
in the future. The model basically uses the same set of control
variables, except that to test for the indirect effect of more
households having invested in SWC we used the predicted SW
from the first model and calculated the average predicted SW
at the village scale. Also, we added a variable representing the
existence of a maintenance fund.20
Plancontributioni = constant + Cβ1 + Iβ2 + PIβ3
+Xiβ4 + Mβ5 + εi . (2)
We expect participatory WSD interventions to influence the
households’ intention to contribute to sustained SWC in two
ways. First, we expect participatory WSD interventions to di-
rectly influence the households’ intention to contribute through
investments in community organization. This is captured by the
relevant coefficient on vector I. Second, we expect an indirect
effect as WSD interventions increase the number of households
investing in SWC. We expect this to have a positive impact
on the households’ intention to contribute because the more
households invest in SWC the higher the expected returns to
maintenance due to positive scale effects. This indirect effect,
which is basically the effect of effective subsidization, is cap-
tured by the coefficient on PI. M is a vector of dummy variables
representing whether the village has a functional maintenance
fund or not.
Data were collected from October 2003 till March 2004
through village meetings, secondary data collection, and a
household survey among 800 households. Data collection took
place in three stages. First, village meetings were organized in
all watershed villages to collect baseline information. Based on
this information and the location of villages in the watershed,
four to six villages were selected. In these villages, a second
round of more extensive village meetings was organized. The
information from these meetings was used for a quantitative
ranking of village performance indicators. Third, in the selected
villages 200 households were randomly selected for an exten-
sive household survey. Per village, 20% of the households were
interviewed for the survey, each questionnaire taking 1–2 hours.
Data collection and entry was undertaken by the NGOs that had
been involved with WSD implementation from the start. For the
data collection, 4–8 surveyors per watershed were trained and
educational status proved more important. Hence, we did not need to use the
predicted value to control for potential endogeneity problems and could use the
stated variable instead. We did test for endogeneity in the main analysis, using
both the stated and the predicted variable, but no significant differences were
found.
20 Village maintenance funds were established by several NGOs to finance
the maintenance of collective structures on the long run. The watershed com-
mittee generally manages the maintenance fund. Of the 22 villages included
in the sample, three villages have a functioning maintenance fund. Household
interviews and village meetings showed that most households in villages with
a maintenance fund believe the fund will maintain all investments, including
investments on private land.
Table 5
The impact of WSD interventions on household investment in SWC (standard
errors in parenthesis)
Household SWC investment
Coefficient (S.E.) Marginal effects
Average income region (rs) 0.08 (0.04) 0.03∗∗
Cash economy (dummy) −0.07 (0.21) −0.03
Very low rainfall region
(dummy)
−0.40 (0.22) −0.16
NGO investment WSD
(dummy)
0.67 (0.18) 0.26∗∗∗
GO investment WSD
(dummy)
0.02 (0.17) −0.01
Downstream location in
watershed (dummy)
−0.34 (0.17) −0.13 ∗∗
Upstream location in
watershed (dummy)
0.13 (0.17) 0.05
Land holding size (acres) 0.04 (0.01) 0.02∗∗∗
Household has access to
irrigation (dummy)
0.24 (0.14) 0.09
Income per capita (Rs ’000) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01
Gini coeff. income capita −4.01 (0.92) −1.6∗∗∗
Black soil (dummy) 0.29 (0.12) 0.11∗∗
Household can influence
decision making (dummy)
−0.01 (0.11) 0.01
Constant 0.46 (0.39)
Number of observations 697
Log likelihood! −416.0
LR Chi2 (df) 115.2 (13)
Likelihood ratio statistic
(Pseudo R2)
0.12
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
∗∗ significant at the 5% level.
sent to question the households in pairs. Afterwards, question-
naires were crosschecked for mistakes and omissions. Although
data were collected in 2003–2004, questions regarding agricul-
tural production and land use refer back to the previous year, or
2002, which was a drought year in all four sites.
4. Results
Table 5 presents the results of the first model. The regression
analysis confirms the results of earlier studies that NGOs are
more effective. The probability of households investing in SWC
increases by 26% in watersheds subjected to participatory in-
tervention. Government intervention, in contrast, does not have
a significant effect.21
Second, households with larger landholdings and black soils
are more inclined to invest in SWC than households with smaller
21 The robustness of results was confirmed with a Chow test that showed
NGO treated households to significantly differ from other households
(P-value = 0.012). The Chow test is conducted by first estimating the model
with the full set of observations, and second estimating separate models for the
subsets of observations between which a structural difference is expected. By
comparing the sum of the log likelihood of the unrestricted models with the log
likelihood of the restricted model the likelihood ratio of the two models can be
derived (Greene, 2003).
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Table 6
Hit and miss table of predictive accuracy for the SWC investment model
SWC = 1 SWC = 0 Total
Probability > 0.5 139 69 208
Probability < 0.5 152 337 489
Total 291 406 697
landholdings and red or other soils. This confirms the finding
that small landowners are less willing to invest because the fixed
costs of land loss to SWC investment are relatively high. Also
it confirms that households with black soil are more likely to
invest since the soil moisture retention capacity of their soil is
relatively high (Wani et al., 2002 and 2003).
Third, village income inequality has a negative impact on
household SWC investment. If, like we argued before, income
inequality indeed reflects an unequal distribution of resource
benefits at the village scale, this suggests that an unequal distri-
bution of conservation benefits negatively affects resource con-
servation. Other contextual variables are not significant. This
could be an indication of the subsidization effect. If house-
holds are heavily subsidized, the relative costs and benefits of
conservation (i.e., opportunity costs of labor, relative benefits
of conservation, etc.) play no role. The significant, positive ef-
fect of average income level per region could either indicate that
average income levels are important for household SWC invest-
ment, or that the specific characteristics of the Vaiju Babulgaon
watershed are conducive for household investment in SWC.
The predictive power of the model can be assessed from
Table 6. The Table shows that the model estimates the probabil-
Table 7
The impact of WSD interventions on household future contributions (standard errors in parenthesis)
Planned contribution–All Planned contribution–Only O&M
Coefficient (S.E.) Marginal effects Coefficient (S.E.) Marginal effects
Average income region (rs) 0.60 (0.12) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.37 (0.09) 0.14∗∗∗
Cash economy (dummy) −1.97 (0.28) −0.68∗∗∗ −1.66 (0.26) −0.57∗∗∗
Very low rainfall (dummy) −2.17 (0.49) −0.72∗∗∗ −1.49 (0.38) −0.53∗∗∗
NGO investment WSD (dummy) 0.28 (0.93) 0.11 −0.40 (0.76) −0.15
GO investment WSD (dummy) −0.34 (0.22) −0.14 −0.48 (0.21) −0.18∗∗
Downstream location in watershed (dummy) 0.39 (0.54) 0.15 0.37 (0.45) 0.14
Upstream location in watershed (dummy) 0.83 (0.27) 0.32 ∗∗∗ 0.45 (0.23) 0.18∗∗
Land holding size (acres) 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 0.01 (0.02) 0.004
HH has access to irrigation (dummy) 0.66 (0.31) 0.26∗∗ 0.59 (0.24) 0.21∗∗
Income per capita (Rs ’000) 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 −0.002 (0.02) −0.001
Gini coeff. income per capita 0.29 (5.22) 0.12 5.72 (4.18) 2.18
Black soil (dummy) 0.44 (0.36) 0.17 −0.01 (0.24) −0.004
Predicted probability of HH investment in SW (%) −2.3 (3.3) −0.91 −1.17 (2.13) −0.45
Average predicted SWC investment in village (%) 1.86 (2.48) 0.74 4.68 (2.38) 1.79∗∗
Availability of maintenance fund (dummy) −1.16 (0.34) −0.41∗∗∗ −1.36 (0.30) −0.38∗∗∗
HH can influence decision making (dummy) 0.48 (0.14) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.30 (0.12) 0.12∗∗
Constant −1.71 (2.57) −4.31 (2.15)
Number of observations 697 697
Log likelihood −251.1 −304.0
LR Chi2 (df) 463.3 (16) 340.5 (16)
Likelihood ratio statistic (Pseudo R2) 0.48 0.36
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
∗∗ significant at the 5% level.
ity of overall household SWC investment with great accuracy
(0.413 as compared to the actual probability of 0.417) but that
the behavior of individual households is estimated with an accu-
racy of only 68%. Predicting individual households’ behavior is
difficult because of the many forms of unobserved heterogene-
ity across households. Also, household specific factors, such as
slope and location in the micro-watershed, are missing from the
analysis.
Now that we have confirmed the result that participatory
approaches are more effective in the short run, we turn to our key
question, whether participatory approaches are more effective
in the long run as well. In Table 7 we present our main results.
First, results show that contextual factors become significant
once households have to finance investments in SWC them-
selves: both market access and aridity now have a significant,
negative effect. The negative impact of high aridity suggests that
high resource scarcity reduces the incentive for resource conser-
vation, possibly because the benefits of investment are relatively
low. The significant, negative effect of market integration seems
to indicate that with the development of a cash economy, the im-
portance of rainfed agriculture for household income decreases
and the opportunity costs of labor start to play a more promi-
nent role. Since more market integrated watersheds tend to have
better access to labor markets, the incentive for households to
maintain SWC in these watersheds could be attenuated.
Second, household access to conservation benefits increases
the probability of households’ contributing to resource con-
servation in a significant way. This is in accordance with the
results of Kerr et al. (2002), who show that households with
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Table 8
Hit and miss table of predictive accuracy planned contribution model—All/
Only O&M
Classified Planned Planned Total
contribution = 1 contribution = 0
Probability > 0.5 265/221 34/55 299/276
Probability < 0.5 73/72 325/349 398/421
Total 338/293 359/404 697
access to irrigation invest structurally more in operation and
maintenance. Similarly, influential households are more likely
to contribute to long-term soil and water conservation, prob-
ably because they have better control over how benefits are
shared.
The most striking and interesting result, however, is that the
type of intervention has no significant effect on the households’
intention to contribute to SWC in the long run. This result is
robust for the alternative definition of the dependent variable
(i.e., including only planned contributions to O&M), although
in that scenario GO interventions do have a significant, negative
impact.22 Also, the indirect effect of increased SWC investment
is insignificant at the household and village scale. This indicates
that household SWC investment does not affect the intention
to maintain investment in a significant way. This result is also
robust for the alternative definition of the dependent variable,
although in this case the percentage of SWC at the village scale
does play a positive and significant role. The availability of a
maintenance fund negatively affects the households’ intention
to contribute to future SWC.23
The predictive accuracy of the model is satisfactory, as can
be inferred from Table 8. The model predicts long-term house-
hold participation accurately and for individual households, the
respective scores for “Planned contribution–All” and “Planned
contribution–Only O&M” are 85% and 82%.
To test the robustness of results we performed two Chow tests
to (a) compare the intentions of NGO treated households with
those of other households and to (b) compare households that
had invested in SWC with households that had not. The first
Chow test confirms the result that the type of intervention has
no structural impact on the intention of households to contribute
to future SWC. The second Chow test confirms that whether
the household had invested in SWC or not has no significant
effect on the broader intention to contribute to resource conser-
vation. However, it is significant with regard to the households’
intention to contribute to O&M (“Planned contribution–Only
O&M”).24
The results indicate that the sustainability of participatory
WSD is seriously threatened. On the one hand, household in-
22 Results are robust when contextual variables are replaced by watershed
scale fixed effects.
23 Household interviews and village meetings indicated that in villages with a
maintenance fund, households felt that the fund should maintain all investments,
including investments on private land.
24 The P-value of the test comparing NGO treatment with the rest is 0.63. The
P-value of the test comparing households with SW with households without
vestments in SWC do not increase household commitment to
contribute to SWC in the long run. Investments in community
organization and awareness do not compensate for this effect.
The direct effect of interventions on the households’ intention
to contribute is also insignificant. The establishment of a main-
tenance fund might improve the sustainability of participatory
WSD25 but this comes at a certain cost: when a maintenance
fund exists, individual households are less likely to contribute
to operation and maintenance.
5. Conclusions
We have examined whether investments in community or-
ganization increase the sustainability of WSD interventions in
India’s semi-arid watersheds. While participatory approaches
are associated with more effective WSD project implemen-
tation in the short term, we find that interventions have no
impact on the intention of households to contribute to opera-
tion and maintenance in the longer run. This result seriously
questions the sustainability of participatory WSD, as it re-
duces the likelihood that SWC investments will be voluntarily
maintained.
Although lower SWC subsidies could possibly improve the
sustainability of participatory WSD, the main challenge for out-
side agents aiming to change the long run development trajec-
tory of semi-arid watersheds is to overcome the poor incentives
for local resource conservation. With rising opportunity costs
of labor and low returns to SWC investment, the long-term in-
centive to maintain SWC investment is low. Local maintenance
funds might help increase the sustainability of participatory
WSD, but establishing maintenance funds would come at the
cost of further reducing the incentives for individual households
to voluntary contribute to future SWC.
With over 30% of the population in India’s semi-arid water-
sheds below the poverty line and with an increasing problem
of groundwater depletion and soil degradation, investments in
resource conservation and increased productivity are crucial for
poverty alleviation and the development of India’s semi-arid re-
gions. However, without addressing the wider context in which
rainfed agricultural production takes place, current WSD pro-
grams cannot be expected to substantially change the outlook
for India’s rural poor. More structural government interventions
seem to be required to make WSD sustainable in the longer term.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the International Water Man-
agement Institute (IWMI), the Swiss Development Corporation
SW is 0.38 for “Planned contribution–All” and 0.06 for “Planned contribution–
O&M.”
25 Village meetings and household interviews indicated that in villages with a
well functioning watershed committee and maintenance fund, structures were
better maintained.
J. Bouma et al. / Agricultural Economics 36 (2007) 13–22 21
(SDC) and the “Livestock Environment Interactions in Water-
sheds” (LEAD) study partners (i.e., SAMUHA, WOTR, Seva
Mandir, and Wassan) for the use of the LEAD household survey
data, the logistic support, and helpful comments. This article
benefited from comments of two anonymous referees, as well
as from participants at the tenth biennial conference of Inter-
national Association for the Study of Common Property, 9–13
July, 2004 in Oaxaca, Mexico, at the ICAR/IWMI/ ICRISAT
workshop “Watershed management challenges: Improved pro-
ductivity, resources and livelihoods,” 3–4 November, 2004 in
New Delhi, India and at the IWMI–TATA annual partner meet-
ing “India’s water economy—bracing up for a turbulent fu-
ture,” 24–26 February, 2005 in Anand, India. An earlier ver-
sion of the article was published in the proceedings of the
ICAR/IWMI/ICRISAT workshop.
Appendix 1: Hydrological and biophysical characteristics
of the study sites
Basic hydrological and biophysical data were collected for
the meso-scale watersheds with the help of field visits, primary
hydrological data collection (rainfall, runoff, temperature),
maps and secondary data regarding land use, groundwater, rain-
fall, soil type, and climate. Primary data were collected for the
year 2003–2004, a year with above average rainfall in Kosgi,
average rainfall in Kalyanpur, but below average rainfall in
Kanakanala and Vaiju Babulgaon (IWMI, 2005).
Table A1 presents the biophysical and demographic charac-
teristics of the study sites. The total area is the total geographical
area of the villages located in the watershed. Since some of this
land might be located outside the watershed, total area differs
from total watershed area. In V. Babulgaon and Kalyanpur,
the difference between total area and watershed area is caused
by the relatively large share of government-owned forestland.
Total arable land is again based on the geographical area of
the watershed village and arable land is defined as cultivated
and cultivatable land. In Kosgi watershed, conditions for agri-
Table A1
Biophysical and demographic characteristics of the study watersheds
State Kosgi Kanakanala Kalyanpur V. Babulgaon
Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Rajasthan Maharastra
Total number of households 4,242 2,643 1,711 1,298
Total number of villages 9 21 11 7
Total area 4,590 ha 13,402 ha 4,664 ha 3,472 ha
Watershed area 3,460 ha 13,064 ha 7,488 ha 4,876 ha
Area treated 58% 48% 27% 24%
Average rainfall 739 mm 499 mm 584 mm 430 mm
Ariditya 0.5 0.31 0.39 0.32
Share of land irrigated 30% 1% –5% 10%–20% 10%–15%
Share of land area with slope > 5% 0 17% 49% 42%
Source: IWMI (2005).
aPrecipitation/evapotranspiration.
cultural production are most favorable whereas in Kanakanala
watershed conditions are relatively poor.
Appendix 2: Details of the WSD interventions
in the project sites
In the Kosgi watershed, watershed implementation by the
government was finished in 2001. Investments were targeted at
ground and surface water recharge, horticulture development,
bunding and percolation pits. Implementation was not partic-
ipatory and few investments in community organization were
made. Of the four villages selected for the study, three were
treated.
In Kanakanala, the NGO SAMUHA is implementing WSD.
Of the villages selected for the study, watershed work is ongoing
in two villages and treatment is finalized in three. In one village,
no watershed work has taken place. Overall, investments focus
on increasing soil moisture and biomass, erosion reduction, and
improved access to supplemental irrigation. Implementation
has been participatory and some investments in community
organization have been made. For investments on private lands,
households contribute 25% of the costs, for investments on
common lands the community contributes 10% with voluntary
labor.
In Kalyanpur, the NGO Seva Mandir has implemented WSD
in three of the selected villages, whereas in three villages the
government invested in WSD. Investments focused on soil
moisture and biomass improvement, reduction of soil ero-
sion and improved access to supplemental irrigation. In the
Seva Mandir villages substantial investments in community or-
ganization were made, but government implementation was
nonparticipatory and top down. In one village, no WSD treat-
ment took place. For investments by Seva Mandir on private
land, households contributed 15% of the costs, for investments
on common land the community contributed 10% in labor. If
investments were made by the government, contributions were
10% and 5%, respectively. In one of the Seva Mandir villages
a functional maintenance fund exists.
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In Vaiju Babulgaon, the NGO Watershed Organisation Trust
(WOTR) invested in two out of five selected villages and in one
other village government investments were made. Government
investments were not participatory and badly implemented, but
investments by WOTR were such that one of the two villages is
considered a model site: considerable investments were made
in community organization, and in both villages a functional
maintenance fund exists. Households contributed 16% to the
costs for both investments on private and common land. In the
remaining two villages no structural investments in WSD were
undertaken, although under drought relief some investments did
take place.
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